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The concept of citizenship is one of the key notions in political philosophy.1 Therefore, it has 
also been shaped by a variety of theoretical approaches. In political liberalism, citizenship has 
been interpreted in terms of basic rights and responsibilities of persons as members of a 
political community (Rawls 1996, 194ff.). As a response to political liberalism, civic 
republicanism has paid tribute to the common good as a core notion in defining citizenship. 
Citizens are persons that should contribute to the common good, foremost so by acting 
virtuously (Pettit 1997; Sunstein 1988; Sewing 1993). In deliberative democracy, citizens are 
interpreted as constituents of the public sphere; they contribute to rational deliberation and to 
an active public forum (Habermas 1994). In short, the meaning of “citizenship” depends on 
the framing political theory. The effect of this situation is a variety of different meanings of 
citizenship. Even though many approaches regard discourse on rights and duties as key, there 
is a variety of options to develop the content of these concepts.  
The already existing diversity in theorizing citizenship has recently again been 
increased. Today, the concept of citizenship is discussed in special discourses on various 
functions of citizens. Instead of focusing on the underlying ideas in the “big programs” of 
political philosophy, the debate is nowadays split into debates that focus on one or another 
subsphere of society. In particular, each of these discourses relates to a particularly 
problematic field of interaction between citizens and the political society and its institutions. 
Instead of debating citizenship per se, authors give a more precise and detailed concept in 
adding adjective qualifiers. The outcome is a variety of qualified concepts of citizenship, 
including ecological citizenship (Bell 2005; Dobson 2003; Hailwood 2005), economic 
citizenship (Ulrich 2001), consumer citizenship (Barber 1999) or educated citizenship 
(Gutman 1999). 
In my view, this transformation of the political and philosophical debate on citizenship 
deserves attention. In particular, it poses some intriguing questions: Does the shift towards 
                                                            
1   This paper is a contribution to the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, 2014, in 
Münster, Sektion Politische Philosophie, 30. September 2014.  
qualified notions of citizenship imply that citizenship is no longer a coherent notion? How 
does citizenship per se as a key notion in political philosophy relate to qualified notions of 
citizenship? And: How do qualified notions of citizenship refer to each other? This talks is 
dedicated to answering this questions – at least so in some respects. Yet, before that, the 
debate on qualified notions of citizenship needs to be portrayed.  
 This contribution has four sections. In order to introduce into the debate on qualified 
concepts of citizenship, the first section discusses three examples. This includes a short sketch 
on economic citizenship, the educated citizen, and on ecological citizenship. The second 
section explores the concept of “citizenship competence”. I argue that the category of a 
competence is particularly suitable to serving as a basic category in debates on qualified 
citizenship. Yet, in order to discuss competences, it is appropriate to going back to the double 
aspect already mentioned. A competence addresses a bare minimum; and it addresses a 
functional role of a person in a specified context. Section three discusses the implications of 
this approach within the context of citizenship debates more broadly. It questions the effects 
of this recent turn in citizenship theory regarding the underlying normative claims in 
citizenship theories. Does the recent turn include a deviation from the big normative themes in 
citizenship theory, as for instance the concepts of freedom and of justice? Or does it add to 
these debates something new? I shall try to give a brief answer to these very general and deep 
questions. Section four discusses some objections against this proposal in order to also give a 
critical assessment the category of a competence and what I have called the recent 
transformation of citizenship theory.  
 
1. Qualified citizenship: three examples   
Recently, citizenship has been reasoned in many special discourses. In order to indicate the 
qualification that citizenship receives, authors have turned to “adjective” concepts of 
citizenship. They do not discuss citizenship per se. Instead, they discuss “economic 
citizenship”, “ecological citizenship” or “educated citizens”. Before addressing these three 
examples, it also has to be said that not all qualified notions of citizenship fit into the 
discourse of philosophy. Some of the concepts are not meant to indicate a subtle layer of 
citizenship; instead, some of them are employed in order to criticize recent developments 
provocatively. Therefore, each of the notion also needs to be scrutinized against the 
background of inherent tensions and perhaps even paradoxes that these notions provoke.2 Yet, 
                                                            
2   As for a discussion of the tensions inherent in „consumer citizenship“, see (Kallhoff, Angela 2013a) 
even these concepts address deep normative issues, including the questions of how the 
democratic rights of citizens will be protected.  
 The three examples that I shall introduce in order to prepare the discussion are: 
economic citizenship, educated citizenship, and green citizenship. It is not the space here to 
discuss them in length.3 Instead, I wish to introduce them in order to prepare the debate on 
transformations in the theory of citizenship.  
 
Economic citizenship  
I shall now turn to our first example: “economic citizenship”. Peter Ulrich reasons the concept 
of “economic citizenship” in the context of an approach to economic philosophy that 
resonates with major themes in political philosophy (Ulrich 2001). In discussing an approach 
to the private sphere of the market that supports political goods, Ulrich relates the discourse 
on economic participation and economic duties to the discourse on republican citizenship in 
political philosophy. His main argument is that performances of the economic sector should 
be evaluated against the background of a valuable life of citizens; simultaneously, citizens 
have the duty to care for economic performances as part of their political life. In defending 
this view, Ulrich introduces a fundamental critique of theories on economics as value-free 
enterprise. Simultaneously, he redefines citizenship in terms of “economic citizenship”. As 
one of the conclusions that are drawn, Ulrich claims “economic rights” for citizens in order to 
enhance the conditions of freedom (Ulrich 2001, 259–288).  
Yet, only one part of his discussion of citizenship is in the lines of civic republicanism. 
Ulrich is also interested in “citizenship rights” in a more general sense. Therefore, he argues 
for access rights of citizens to the economic sector. Moreover, these rights are not interpreted 
as claim-rights, but rather as rights that citizens need to defend actively (ibid.). Another 
revisionist part of the theory defines citizenship in terms of virtues that persons need to fulfill 
their role as citizens and as participants in the private sector simultaneously. Economic 
citizenship is given a normative turn in that it says how individuals should act within the 
realm of economic performances as persons who – as political persons – are responsible for 
the realm of life.  
 In two respects, this approach differs from former approaches to economic 
ethics in the context of the broader debate in philosophy. Firstly, citizenship is not identified 
with freedom of choice in the market, as for instance proposed by the Friedmans (Friedman 
und Rose D. Friedman 1990; Friedman 2002). Even though this particular approach has been 
                                                            
3   For a thorough discussion of each of these dimensions of citizenship, see (Kallhoff, Angela 2013b). 
attributed to the “Chicago School of economics”, many subscribe to the idea that citizens 
should be free to partake in the sphere of the market according to the preferences they share. 
Secondly, in Ulrich’s approach the economic sphere is not regarded as a separate sphere of 
life, in particular as different from spheres of political life that are the appropriate reference 
for citizenship discourses. Instead, citizenship is specified regarding this subsphere of society. 
More general insights in the rights and duties of citizens are applied to the sphere of 
economics. I shall turn later to a more thorough discussion of this proposal. For the moment, I 
shall leave it here and introduce a second qualified concept of citizenship: the educated 
citizen.   
 
The educated citizen 
The second example for a recently intense discourse on qualified conceptions of citizenship is 
the debate on “citizenship education”. As political liberals have been discussed for a long 
time, citizenship education is a delicate matter (Mill 1989; Humboldt 1903). On the one hand, 
persons cannot take part actively in political life, unless they are equipped with a basic 
education. In order to understand the main functions and mechanisms of political life and to 
be capable of forming a political judgment, persons need to be educated. They need to 
develop their intellectual capacities and need to develop capacities to judge. Even though the 
content of necessary intellectual capacities of citizens cannot be set in an abstract way, Amy 
Gutman appears to be right in saying that citizens need to be in a better situation than the 
UNESCO demands in terms of minimal literacy. At the very least, they also need to be in a 
situation to understand and interpret the main political texts, e.g. the constitution of a country 
(Gutman 1999). Martha Nussbaum adds that citizens also need to develop an understanding of 
the variety of lives that are lead in various parts of the world in order to develop a sense of 
world citizenship. In particular, she argues in favor of education in Universities that subscribe 
to a focus on the Humanities – persons should read about foreign lives in order to develop the 
capacity to imagine lives that differ from their own (Nussbaum 1997). 
Yet, on the other hand, in order to respect the intellectual freedoms of persons, the 
nation state should refrain from shaping the content and style of education. Even though many 
agree that education should be supported by the nation state, diversity in education and 
freedom of shaping the content is also an important right of the institutions providing 
education. Therefore, a sharp line between interests of the state in educated citizens and 
interests of citizens must also be respected.  
The insight of both the need and the limits of state support for education have been 
reiterated through the history of philosophy. Yet, the recent debate on citizenship education 
also highlights some new aspects. Authors in political philosophy are aware that education in 
terms of literacy etc. is not sufficient for becoming a citizen of our age. Instead, citizenship 
education comprises the teaching of mutual respect and virtues that have been developed in 
the context of debating the basics of political liberalism (Galston 1989; Macedo 1990). In 
order to participate actively in a culture of debate and argumentation, it is necessary to learn 
listening to other citizens and deliberating commonly. In short, citizenship discourse does not 
only have to focus on the content of citizenship; it rather also needs to include a debate on the 
capacities and the conditions for realizing capacities in order to partake actively in political 
life. “Educated citizenship” is a concept that highlights this broader context.  
 
Green citizenship  
Another important discourse in terms of “qualified notions of citizenship” focuses on the 
relationship between citizens and nature. Obviously, the overall ecological situation is one of 
a deep crisis. Authors in philosophy have interpreted this crisis as also resulting from a 
misinterpretation of citizenship; at the very least, environmental duties and environmental 
rights have not been reasoned sufficiently. In this context, proposals for reasoning “green 
citizenship” in a forward-looking way have also been made. Andrew Dobson was one of the 
first authors who defended a concept of ecological citizenship that highlights not only the 
rights of citizens regarding a natural environment, but also the duties that citizens have 
regarding nature (Dobson 2003). Since Dobson made this proposal, many authors have 
elaborated proposals not only for reasoning “green citizenship”, but for doing so in the 
context of the liberal state. Since duties to care for the natural environment cannot be 
reasoned without also debating the impact on liberties of citizens – as for instance most 
obviously regarding individual life-style and mobility - , they try to reconcile political 
liberalism with environmental duties in various ways (Barry 1999; Eckersley 2004; Barry und 
Wissenburg 2001). Some authors do not prefer the parlance of the “green state” or “green 
citizenship”, but instead explore the issue in terms of “green rights” or “rights to a green 
future” – often so in a critical approach (Doherty und Geus 1996; Hayward 2004; Hiskes 
2009).  
It is not the space here to get into that discussion in more detail. Yet, some core 
insights of these approaches shall be highlighted. These are insights that the authors appear to 
share, even though their theories vary immensely as for the details. Firstly, the approaches to 
green citizenship highlight the need to transcend the idea that it is a matter of theories of 
justice to discuss the share that persons deserve in terms of natural resources. Instead, they 
understand that citizenship cannot be reasoned without also exploring the relationship 
between citizens and nature on a basic level (Bell 2005). The question is not whether or not 
persons deserve a distinct share in natural resource. It is also the question of whether or not 
persons have access to an intact environment and what the rights and duties in this 
relationship are. Secondly, some general presuppositions in reasoning citizenship are 
challenged in theories of green citizenship. Obviously, the ecological crisis is a global 
phenomenon. Yet, reasons for debating environmental citizenship in units that are detached 
from the nation-state do not only result from empirical facts. Instead, the claim that 
environmental citizenship needs to cohere with green agendas that transcend political units, is 
an explicit normative claim. Whether or not the global level is the most adequate unit, is 
another question.   
 
Before the next steps in debating qualified notions of citizenship will be done, I shall give 
some brief comments on the proposals that have been referred to so far. In comparing the 
proposals and in reconsidering debates on qualified concepts of citizenship, two insights can 
already be summarized. Firstly, even though qualified concepts address particular problems -  
often so in a critical way -  they are not detached from the big themes in political philosophy. 
Even though always related to a specified area of political life, they address basically 
normative claims in terms of the freedoms of citizens and their rights and duties. Moreover, 
they do not result in path-breaking new approaches to citizenship. Instead, they draw on 
insights that have been reasoned in normative approaches to citizenship before.  
Secondly and differently from former debates on citizenship the debate points to a 
blind spot in former theories of citizenship. It says that former theories of citizenship do not 
pay attention to the fact that citizens need to be equipped both with occasions and with 
capacities to fulfill the obligations of citizenship. I shall turn to this latter point in the 
following section.  
 
2. Citizenship competence: a new focus of concern  
My question in this section is: What do qualified notions of citizenship – as shortly introduced 
in the last section – imply in terms of presuppositions of citizenship? Obviously, one of the 
messages of qualified notions of citizenship is that persons need to be prepared in order to 
fulfill citizenship duties and in order to “function” as citizens. This is indeed an important 
blind spot of the “big programs” in political philosophy. In complex political societies, the 
content and the normative principles expressed in terms of citizenship duties need to correlate 
with capacities of persons to fulfill them. This leads to an important question: How can 
persons be supported in order to partake actively in the citizenry?  
Instead of questioning the approaches to citizenship that have been reasoned in the 
tradition of political philosophy, it adds a new perspective. I guess that many philosophers 
agree that citizens deserve a set of basic rights (political liberalism), they would agree to the 
relevance of some political definition of the common good and corresponding political virtues 
(civic republicanism); most philosophers also agree that the public forum is the forum for 
citizens to debate on issues of public concern (deliberative democracy). Yet, the general 
insights do not suffice in order to explain how persons come into the situation to actually live 
a life of active citizenship.  
A theory that can answer to these claims has two characteristics. Firstly, one key 
category is “citizenship competence”. A “competence” has two sides: on the one hand, it 
relates to a sphere of life or to a system that provides a normative frame. It explicates the tasks 
that persons have to fulfill in terms of a distinct competence. The competent reader knows to 
read a book; the competent citizen instead knows how to participate in the sphere of 
citizenship life. The concept of a competence is close to, yet not identical with a functional 
interpretation. A competent person responds to a situation which challenges her – yet, she 
responds in a way which standards of best practices and adequate behavior in that situation 
prescribe. A competent speaker knows the rules of a language; moreover, she knows to apply 
the rules correctly. Yet, the competent speaker is also the person without whom language in 
its current form would no longer exist. The competent speaker even transforms language – 
together with all the other competent speakers. The competent citizen knows now to 
participate in subspheres of shared life – be it the economic sphere or the sphere of education 
or – more recently – environmental challenges. Yet, simultaneously, it is part of the 
competence to shape the sphere according to best knowledge and know-how.  
In particular, competences of citizens are not restricted to politics any longer. Instead, 
one of the key messages of qualified concepts of citizenship is that the rights and duties that 
have been attributed to persons as citizens are as important in the context of education, 
economics or relations to the nature as in explicitly political activities. Yet, on the other hand, 
a competence also denominates something that a person must have, must possess in order to 
being in a situation to fulfill a certain task. Competence means a equipment, yet one that 
persons deserve as members of a political society.4 This encapsulates a normative claim: 
Citizens do not have to equip themselves with the presuppositions to unfold a capacity. 
Instead, persons deserve that equipment.5 
Secondly, competences whose support citizens deserve are not uniform. Instead, they 
correspond to the spheres of life in which citizens need to claim their rights, need to fulfill 
their duties, and need to contribute to actively shaping normative frameworks. This includes 
the spheres of economics, of education and of the human-nature relationship. Yet, it also goes 
beyond this. It also includes new perspectives in terms of cosmopolitan citizenship (Appiah 
1996; Benhabib 2006). It also needs to be emphasized that it includes the special needs of 
women as female citizens (Fraser und Gordon 1994; Moller Okin 1989, 1991; Rosenblum 
2002; Shklar 1991). As for the design of a theory of citizenship competences, this insight 
proposes the structure of a list-theory (Kallhoff 2013b). The items are not reducible to each 
other, but instead are necessary elements in order to mirror the rich content of citizenship. 
Each point on the list corresponds to a specified sphere of citizenship, as for instance: a 
citizen as a free person, a citizen as involved in the market sphere, a citizen as person that 
deserves education. In particular, the debate on the content of duties and rights of citizens is 
not detached from debates about the internal capabilities of persons on the one hand and 
external presuppositions in order to develop competences on the other hand.6  
 
3. Theoretical consequences  
This new turn in theories of citizenship has some immediate effects on theory-building in that 
area of research. Before highlighting this, I wish to emphasize what this shift does not amount 
to. It is not fair to regard it as an effort to get rid of the “big programs” of philosophy and the 
underlying moral claims.  Quite the opposite is true: The approaches to qualified concepts of 
citizenship highlight the need to rethink normative claims that have been reasoned for many 
years, if not centuries. To remind us of only some of the key historical perspective on 
citizenship: Aristotle’s Politics of the 4th century B.C. is regarded as the first systematic 
                                                            
4   This aspect of the term „competence“ is most obvious in the meaning of the „beneficium 
competentiae“ in Law. This gift is one that a person deserves without presuppositions; it refers to the living 
minimum that cannot be withheld from any person, even from persons who have committed a crime.   
5   This claim comes close to Martha Nussbaum’s claim that political institutions need to provide persons 
with the conditions for developing a basically good life in terms of basic functional capabilities (Nussbaum 
2000; Nussbaum 2003). 
6   The distinction between internal and external aspects of capabilities is borrowed from Nussbaum’s 
analysis of functional capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 84–85). Nussbaum argues that the development of 
capabilities into combined capabilities presupposes both the equipment with internal capacities, as well as 
support from outside. Different from Nussbaum, I do not relate to presuppositions of a good life, but instead 
my discussion focuses on roles of citizens in a political community.  
approach to a theory of citizenship (Aristotle 2009). Aristotle thinks that citizens are persons 
who are willing and predisposed to partaking in the political agencies of the city-state 
(Aristotle 2009, III.1, 1275 a 22–24; 1275 b 18–22). Moreover, Aristotle is very much 
concerned about the virtues of citizens. Indeed, he thinks that justice is a core competence in 
both governing the city-state and serving as a member of the citizenry (Aristotle 2009, III. 4–
5).  
Since then, debates about the political person are an integral part of political 
philosophy. I shall not recall this debate here. Instead, I shall just remind us of the reception 
of the fact that ancient philosophy did not only characterize the citizen in terms of active 
participation in political affairs and institutions. Instead, following a claim of J.G.A. Pocock 
(Pocock 1995), the structure of the debate on citizenship was already manifested in ancient 
philosophy. In ancient philosophy, two ideals of citizenship were already explicated and 
contrasted with each other: This is the idea of civic freedom on the one hand, and the idea of 
civic equity that was prefigured by Roman Law and its concept of personhood (ibid.). Since 
then, the debate on citizenship has primarily been an attempt to either juxtapose or reconcile 
both ideals: the ideal of civic liberty that in ancient philosophy received the specific shape of 
freedom to shape the political affairs (Constant 1946), and the ideal of equity - a debate that in 
terms of “distributive justice” has an enormous impact on the idea of justified claims of 
citizens until today.  
In my view, the recent debate on qualified concepts of citizenship does not shift this 
focus of concern. Instead, it addresses sub-spheres of societies in which both normative 
perspectives are particularly challenging, perhaps even endangered. In order to underpin this 
claim, let me recall the examples of section 1.  
As for economic citizenship, the main worry of philosophers is not whether or not 
citizens are free to choose or to partake in the market sphere. Instead, they discuss the 
particular limits and concrete contents of freedom in the economic sphere. Moreover, a 
general claim is that citizens should not only be free to partake in the economic sphere; 
instead, they should be free to do so under conditions that do not infringe on their basic civic 
freedoms and conditions of justice, including the chance to choose an adequate workplace, the 
opportunity to partake in the gains of economic performances (Ulrich 2001).  
As for educated citizenship, the main worry is that persons might not be in a situation 
to partake actively in the various spheres of political life. This includes worries about literacy; 
yet, it goes far beyond that. Citizens are not equipped with citizenship competences, if they 
are not in a situation to debate and to exchange rational arguments; they cannot shape political 
agendas effectively if they do not have access to books and to new media and if they have not 
learned to imagine life-styles and ways of life that differ from theirs. In order to defend their 
liberty by means of political participation and in order to contribute actively to fair politics, 
citizens first need to be equipped with the competences of reading and of interpretation, as 
well as of rational exchange of arguments.  
As for green citizenship, it is certainly unfair to ask persons to change their way of life 
in order to protect the environment – without providing opportunities for effective change. 
Some authors argue that environmental duties depend on the prospects of success; others 
argue that even negative duties that transcend the limits of personal relations or the nation 
state need to be supported by institutional means that enhance the conditions of fulfilling 
duties effectively. Independent of the varieties in defending green duties do many authors 
subscribe to the thesis that citizens need to be equipped both with green education as well as 
with institutional settings that enhance and enable an ecological lifestyle. Here again, the big 
themes are freedoms of citizens on the one hand, as balanced against claims of justice on the 
other hand. It is not easy to develop theories of justice that also pay respect to the liberties of 
individuals. Yet, theories of green citizenship claim that it is necessary to do so – both in 
empirical and in normative respects.  In short, recent approaches to qualified notions of 
citizenship share the concern for the “deep morality” of citizenship with approaches to 
citizenship in the history of thought and the big programs in political philosophy likewise.   
 
4. Critical assessment of this proposal 
In this paper, I have first outlined some examples of qualified concepts of citizenship that 
document the turn towards qualifiers in debating the concept of citizenship. I have argued that 
the turn towards qualified notions of citizenship is another remarkable transformation of 
citizenship theory in political philosophy, in particular one that is still ongoing. In section 2, I 
have discussed “competence” as an adequate category in order to highlight the theoretical 
impact of that transformation in theory-building. In section 3, I have given another assessment 
of that transformation. I have argued that even though the debate on competences provides a 
new focus of concern, this does not include a loss of former big issues in citizenship theory. 
Instead, both the claims of freedoms of citizens and of justice are echoed in recent debates on 
qualified notions. In particular, authors try to give both liberties and claims of justice a more 
concrete content in addressing these themes in the context of particular sub-spheres of civic 
life.  
In order to shape the argument, I shall finally discuss challenges to the theoretical 
approach of this paper. The most challenging aspect correlates with the status of citizenship 
rights as unalienable rights. To put it negatively: If this approach implied that “full 
citizenship” and the attribution of a full set of rights depends on good performances in terms 
of citizenship competences, this approach would break with a basic dogma of citizenship 
theory in political liberalism and beyond: Presupposed persons are qualified as citizens – 
which implies the double claim of political reality, yet also of normative claims of inclusion 
(Benhabib 2004) –, in a situation like that their rights do not depend on their performances of 
citizens; instead, citizenship rights are unalienable rights. In my view, this objection is not as 
difficult to handle as one might think. The normative weight of claiming that citizens should 
be equipped with competences to participate successfully in the sub-spheres of political life is 
firstly put onto two different shoulders, and secondly it is detached from the basic rights of 
citizens as claim rights. As for the first aspect, the claim that persons should be equipped with 
competences has been addressed to political institutions (see section 2). It is not the duty of 
each person to develop competences; instead, persons should be equipped with means in order 
to being in a position to develop citizenship competences.7As for the second aspect, a theory 
of citizenship competences does not substitute for basic rights; instead, it translates them into 
a more concrete setting and perhaps it also gives them new directions.  
In my view, the concept of competences is not primarily helpful in discussing “full 
citizenship” as opposed to something like “good citizenship”. Instead, it highlights and 
simultaneously transforms a key insight in citizenship theory. In defining citizenship, one of 
the most important endeavours is to define the lines between spheres of political influence and 
a realm that owes its shape and its contents to the engagement of persons as private persons. 
One way to react to this demand is the effort to define clearly what political institutions have 
to do and what they should refrain from. Even though this has been a key issue throughout the 
centuries, it has proven extremely difficult to give a clear idea of where this line can be 
drawn. Instead of developing a general formula for this, the concept of “competences” offers 
the chance to rethink that line in different lines. A competence also demarcates the units that 
                                                            
7   One might argue that it is wishful thinking that persons really want to develop citizenship 
competences. In order to address this claim, it would be necessary to take a closer look on the set of 
competences that are addressed in theories of qualified citizenship. Yet, part of the answer can also be given 
without this detailed discussion: Citizenship competences are not isolated from each other; instead, they need 
to be interpreted as mutually supportive capabilities. In Kallhoff (2013) I argue that a list‐theory implies a 
second look on the mutual relationship between the various spheres of citizenship; this can only done by taking 
a close look on specified competences. Competences of green citizenship, for instance, can be supported by 
competences as educated citizenships – yet only so, if education implies education in ecology and in 
sustainable practices of life. For a more detailed discussion, see (Kallhoff 2013, pp. 205ff.).  
each citizen is in a position not only to respond to, but also to form and shape. Instead of 
asking what political institutions should refrain from, it draws attention to spheres of justified 
influence of citizens – in building on the specified capacities of citizens. Moreover, an 
approach to citizenship competences implies that there is no general idea about the sphere of 
influence that political institutions should have – except for the idea that citizens have an 
alienable right to a minimum provision in each sphere of competences. What precisely this 
minimum implies is a question that has to be decided in discussing the specific spheres.  
At the end of this paper, I also wish to highlight that this approach to citizenship might 
have some positive side-effects. First of all, it allows a more concrete discussion of 
citizenship in concrete terms – moreover it allows discussing a variety of recent 
developments, including critical assessments of rather new aspects of citizenship, as for 
instance “cyber citizenship” or “consumer citizenship”. Secondly, it does not leave the realm 
of liberalism, but instead adds to the discussions on a “spatious liberalism”.8 Many political 
liberals are no longer satisfied with an approach on political society that abstracts from the 
concrete needs of citizens as well as from the need to shape political institutions accordingly. 
Education, health care etc. are themes that belong on the political agenda. Simultaneously, it 
does not suffice to keep these issues apart from the core issues of political liberalism. Instead, 
the public goods and the needs that correspond to them are as important as civil rights and 
political rights.9 Thirdly, the concept of citizenship competences sets an accent that differs 
from more conventional approaches of citizenship. In particular, it leaves realm for rethinking 
the relevance of political units to discussing citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship has been 
tied to the nation state. Yet, an approach to citizenship competences leaves realm for 
addressing units different from that political entity. Citizenship competences need to be 
discussed on a transnational, perhaps even global scale.  
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